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L INTRODUCTION 
American companies have long sought ways to expand into foreign markets. This 
is an attempt to take advantage of the natural resources, untapped market potential, or cheaper 
labor in foreign lands. Latin America has, in recent years, become a leading region for such 
projects. In particular, Argentina was placed on the short list of emerging markets for potential 
investment in the late 1980's and has since become a key player in the economic development of 
South America. My purpose in writing this paper is to first, discuss the economic fundamentals of 
what the current administration has done to bring the Argentine economy to the point of stability 
and secondly, to discuss ways in which American companies, from various sectors, have 
evaluated, penetrated and currently operate in this market. The primary mode of research was 
interviews conducted on site in the city of Buenos Aires, Argentina with corporate executives 
from American companies. A great deal of time was also spent gathering and studying current 
periodicals (newsprint, magazines, etc.). Research indicates that the Menem administration has 
affected significant change by their aggressive policies. These changes, while serving to stem 
hyperinflation and boost confidence, have resulted in a marked stabilization and a period of 
consistent growth. Also indicated is that American businesses have found success in this region 
by being very methodical in their penetration methods and taking a long term view of the 
Argentine economy, its resources, and the future prospects for success in this region. 
ECONOMIC mSTORICAL CONTEXT 
Argentina has long since been known for its considerable economic potential. Throughout 
this century, Argentina has shown glimpses of this potential. In the periods following the great 
depression and World War II the Argentine economy was ranked in the top ten in terms of size. 
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Despite this promise, from the 1940's until the late 1980's, Argentina failed to capitalize, primarily 
due to poor political and economic leadership. Endowed with abundant human and natural 
resources, Argentina had tremendous potential for economic development in the mid-1980's. 
Despite these impressive resources, the country was buffeted by vicious cycles of political 
instability and erratic government policies which gave rise to economic and social disruptions. 
Though one of Latin America's wealthiest nations, this atmosphere of uncertainty made it difficult 
for Argentina to capitalize on its considerable potential. 
Mid 70's to Mid 80's 
The nine year period from 1976 to 1985 was one particularly marred by political instability 
and enervated growth. During this period, stable growth and development was directly affected 
by the number of policy changes implemented. Though intended to improve overall economic 
stability, the inconsistency of policy manifested itself in poor economic performance. In this 
period alone, Argentina was lead by four different military regimes, one civilian administration and 
seven different economic ministers with seven differing economic philosophies (5). The economy 
was one obvious victim of these marked vacillations. Inflation, as measured by the consumer 
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price index, rose to a 
hyperinflationary state in 1989 to 
4,923 percent (4). Similarly, the Gross 
Domestic Product (GOP) rose and fell 
each year from 1977 to 1984, as 
shown in the figure (5). Despite 
efforts on the part of the military 
dictators holding power in the 1980's, public support grew weary as evidenced by 
anti-government protests and rampant looting. The economy continued on its downward spiral; 
for example, in 1982 alone inflation rose to 200 percent and the country went into default on its 
private foreign debt of approximately $50 billion (6). In the same year while the military 
government was attempting to make a smooth transition to a civilian government, they agreed to 
an economic austerity plan in cooperation with the IMF. This was an attempt to manage the huge 
$50 billion external debt by way of refinancing old debt with new debt (6). Though this was 
achieved, it failed in its attempt to establish any confidence in the Argentine market. Of course it 
was the general public who bore the brunt of the sour economy. In 1983 workers real income 
fell to nearly a quarter of what it had been in years past (8). Take home pay of the average 
worker was nearly one million pesos a week. ... roughly $19(6). In an attempt to bridle this facet of 
the economy a wage-price freeze known as the "Austral Plan" was put in place in 1985. Despite 
the collective efforts on the part of the administration, the economy failed to show consistent 
improvement. 
Late 1980's - Earlv 1990 's 
In the1985 election President Alfonsin was elected by a very thin margin; yet, despite the 
speed at which he began addressing economic issues, the economy seemed content to continue 
spinning out of control. Prices were rising at more than 30 percent a month and industrial output 
plummeted, as a result, income naturally continued to decline (6). In 1989 and 1990 the GDP, 
adjusted for inflation, dropped a total of 6 percent (6). Despite President Alfonsin's initiatives his 
popularity plummeted which eventually lead to an early relinquishment of his presidency and "The 
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Red House. II The period leading up to 1990 proved to be one of the most tumultuous eras for the 
Argentine economy and the country as a whole. 
The 1990's began as somewhat of a continuation of the previous decade. A new 
administration under Carlos Saul Menem, former governor of the interior province La Rioja, took 
office in May of 1989 with 47 percent of the popular vote. This marked the first time in over 
seventy years that an opposition party had successfully taken office and the first time that the 
"Peronista" party would rule without Juan Peron himself Analysts reasoned that if this 
administration could succeed, Argentina might have a chance of achieving genuine democracy (6). 
This would not prove to be an easy undertaking. Inflation in July of 1989 rose to 200 percent and 
the purchasing power of real wages had dropped nearly 25 percent to the lowest in the country's 
history (7). The soaring interest rates, a nonrenewal policy on deposits, and the refusal of the 
Central Bank to release inaccessible deposits in adequate quantities created a severe financial 
crisis in regards to capital reserves (8). Essentially, the rate of new deposits was insufficient to 
cover the interest on maturing deposits, resulting in soaring interest rates--shooting over a 100 
percent per month mark (8). The natural result was an increase in domestic debt. This was in 
addition to the external debt to which no interest had been paid since 1988(8). The fiscal deficit 
I Rate oftnlatton In Consumer Prices I 
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was also at an 8 year high of $55 
billion (8). As if this were not enough, 
the drop in industrial production 
reached 5 percent between April and 
May of 1989, owing itself to the three 
distinct recessionary waves of this 
period: first from October 1984 to August 1989, second from November 1986 to the end of 
1987, and finally at the beginning of Men em's first term in office(8). 
MENEM'S RECOVERY PLAN 
In an attempt to take decisive action, the Menem administration undertook two separate 
stabilization plans in 1989 and 1990, neither of which succeeded due to the inability to address the 
fiscal deficit. The chief results of these first two moves were two periods marked by 
hyperinflationary outbursts reaching 4924 percent in 1989 and 1344 percent in 1990 as shown in 
figure 2(9). In 1991 the Menem economic team, headed by Dr. Domingo Cavallo, the Harvard 
educated economist, implemented several aggressive economic plans with aspirations of opening 
the economy and exercising stdct fiscal and monetary discipline. It was determined that the main 
engines of growth would be state reform, open markets, foreign direct investment, trade 
liberalization and currency convertibility. Thus began an intensive reform program designed to 
defeat hyperinflation, rebuild the state, institute a popular market economy, and integrate 
Argentina into the global economy( 1 0), 
TURNING THE CORNER 
Through these comprehensive economic reforms, Argentina has vastly improved 
economic performance and permitted the economy to break out of the stop and start cycles of the 
past. Though the reform effort continues, the results are already highly encouraging: Between 
1991 and 1994 there was a cumulative increase of 34 percent in the gross domestic product (fig. 
1); consumer prices increased 3.9%; gross domestic fixed investment increased 25 percent in 
1991,31 percent in 1992, 14 percent in 1993, and 18.2 percent in 1994(9). Foreign direct 
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investment went from one billion dollars in 1989 to 6.2 billion in 1993 as shown in the figure 
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below( 6). Capital goods imports, another 
major indicator of confidence and investment 
in the economy doubled in 1992, increased by 
another 33 percent in 1993, and went up yet 
another 47 percent in 1994. Exports of 
~ _______________ ." manufactured goods have surged as these 
investments have come on line, rising 26 percent in 1994 alone(8). 
THE 1995-1999 FIVE YEAR PLAN 
The first pillar of the administration's restructuring plan was a wide scale state reformation 
which was carried out through an all-inclusive privatization program. What ensued was a sharp 
cutback in public employment and expenditure, elimination of public enterprise subsidies, 
improved tax collection coupled with the elimination of distortionary taxes. 
The next step of this program was the recreation ofa market economy. This was 
primarily carried out by way of an elimination of controls on prices, wages, interest rates, foreign 
exchange rates, and capital flows. As well, a broad deregulation that impeded free market 
operations has been swept away in hopes of lowering costs of doing business in Argentina. 
The third move in this process was an investment and trade liberalization. In hopes of 
allowing foreign investors the same treatment as local investors, registration requirements were 
eliminated, full access to local markets was allowed and unrestricted repatriation of profits was 
granted. As for foreign trade, nearly all non-tariff barriers and export taxes were dropped. With 
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the creation of the Mercosur trade pact between Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay, trade 
liberalization has been extended even further. 
The final and most aggressive step in this recovery plan was the Convertibility Plan. 
Implemented in April of 1991, the Convertibility Act states that the local currency must be fully 
backed by foreign reserves and gold at a fixed exchange rate of one peso per US dollar. In this 
law, indexation was prohibited, money creation to finance debt by way of inflation was proscribed 
and subsequent legislation established the independence of the Central Bank and prioritized its 
role to the defense of the national currency. 
The Convertibility Act was put to the test as a result of the liquidity crisis stemming from 
the 1994 devaluation of the Mexican Peso. However, instead of retreating from this policy, the 
system was reinforced. Immediate steps were taken to privatize the financial system and move 
budget into a surplus, eventually reaching $4.4 billion in 1995(10). Although Argentina suffered 
from the exodus of capital resulting from the Mexican meltdown, by the beginning of the second 
quarter of 1995 there had already been a positive shift in the behavior of the financial and capital 
markets. With these policies in place, the administration had laid the ground work for future 
stability and growth. Public confidence in this program and the current administration was shown 
in the reelection victory of President Carlos Menem in May of 1995 with 50% of the total vote. 
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IL SECTORANALYSES 
It is within the economic framework discussed in the previous section that American 
companies must compete and operate. These companies must take into consideration many 
factors when evaluating potential and current operations including tax issues, labor relations, 
patent laws,etc. The following analyses are profiles of American companies that have been 
operating in Argentina for various amounts of time and in differing markets. Based on personal 
interviews with corporate executives, these analyses present a unique view on the Argentine 
market, company operations, competition, success and prospects for the future. 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (CITIBANK, N.A.l 
Perhaps it is the banking industry that varies most directly and is most involved in the 
radical economic changes taking place in Latin America and specifically in Argentina. Generally 
speaking, the banking industry serves as the primary financial intermediary between the population 
and the economy. As the world market fluctuates, and as the current Argentinean administration 
implements more policy changes, the reaction of the banking industry must be immediate in order 
to maintain the already timid confidence in the Argentine economy. This is typically carried out by 
the manipulation of consumer and corporate lending terms, interest rate changes, new product 
developments, and availability of foreign trade lines. 
HISTORICAL AND CURRENT OPERATIONS 
Citibank of North America began its operations in Argentina in 1914 as a direct result of 
the demand created by American companies seeking financing and lines of credit in order to 
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establish themselves in Argentina. Since this time Citibank has persevered through economic 
catastrophes, military dictatorships, and revolutions only to emerge as a leader in the banking 
industry in Argentina. 
Currently Citibank's market share is based on an approximate 50150 split between the 
consumer market and corporate finance market. In the consumer market, Citibank offers credit 
cards, current accounts, personal loans, mortgages, and money market accounts. Despite recently 
lifting taxes imposed on current accounts, the mentality of the average Argentine remains one of 
reluctance. This would account for the fact that the nurrlber of current accounts held by 
Argentines remains markedly low, almost a third of their counterparts in Brazil and a tenth of that 
in the United States. However, the banking industry sees these policy changes as indicative of 
changes to come and thus, the consumer banking sector as an area of sizable market potential. 
Originally, Citibank began operations in Argentina for the same reasons many other 
foreign banks did, to serve as financiers for international market establishments and to meet the 
needs offoreign investors. Primarily, these banks specialize in direct lending, capital market 
issues, initial public offerings, capital management, foreign trade, and derivatives when available. 
Due to the inherent risks associated with dealing with middle or small size corporations, many of 
these banks limit themselves to well established international corporations. 
COMPETITION 
In tenns of numbers, Citibank is but one of many players in the financial markets in 
Argentina. Nearly 50% of the financial market share remains in the hands of the State owned 
banks, including Banco Nacion y Banco Provincial. The remaining market is divided among the 
30 established foreign banks, 20 local public banks, and 70 local privately held banks. 
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Ignacio Morello, a manager with Citibank in Argentina, says that the economic 
environment in Argentina has been revolutionary in its developments and within the past 5 years 
has completely changed the face of competition. For example, five years ago simply being a 
foreign bank was a guarantee for business. With the inherent instability projected on Latin 
economies, the slightest hint of a shudder in the markets created an exodus of capital into 
foreign banks due to their ties with the stable American or European economies. During times of 
relative stability and confidence, foreign banks' access to foreign markets, coupled with their 
ability to provide financing at lower rates, has made them far more attractive than their domestic 
counterparts. 
With the current administration's movement toward an open economy, many of the larger 
domestic banks have made great strides in terms of access to the very same foreign markets. For 
example, Banco Galicia and Banco Rio, two of the larger domestic banks, have made substantial 
progress in the last five years to take advantage of the free market by establishing partnerships 
with foreign banks. The result of this has been easier access to foreign trade lines, greater 
confidence from consumers, and the inherent advantages that come with being attached to a 
strong parent company. In fact, competition in the area of foreign trade has become so strong 
that Citibank has begun to decrease its marketing efforts in this area because the larger domestic 
banks can offer the same products and there is therefore very little if any profit. Despite these 
marked improvements on the part of domestic banks, a dark cloud of skepticism continues to 
loom over head. 
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IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 1994 
Naturally, the financial markets were the hardest hit by the economic crisis of 1994. 
Though the principle of convertibility contributes to confidence, it also, by law, prevents the 
central bank from intervening on behalf of the peso. As well, at the time there was a shortage of 
business in real terms of investments and as a result many of the larger brokerage houses and 
banks invested heavily in the bond market. As the Mexican economy began its own melt down, 
loans from abroad became harder and harder to come by thus creating liquidity crises. This, in 
conjunction with rising bond rates in the US in February 1994, the inability of the central bank to 
intervene, and the lack of foreign loans from abroad and confident investors, caused a capital 
flight of massive proportion throughout all Latin America. In an attempt to reassure the 
Argentine market, the central bank, more accurately the Harvard educated economic minister 
Domingo Cavallo, employed several strategies: First, they began to make loans on the remnants 
of their reserves to the now desperate domestic banks in an attempt to aid them in remaining 
liquid. Secondly, they reinstituted deposit guarantees much the same as the FDIC in the US. 
Although this aided in allowing the suffering banks to endure the crisis in the short run, it seems 
now only to have delayed the inevitable. Mr. Morello feels that these banks will go under due to 
their indebtedness to the central bank, thus leaving only the banks that were able early on to 
establish ties with foreign banks or remain independently solvent. 
As a result of the latest crisis, the surviving banks can be broken down into three 
categories. First the 15 well established and backed banks that remained relatively strong despite 
economic constraints. These will undoubtedly pursue new market potential and continue to grow. 
Second, the struggling banks that are now heavily indebted to the central bank, consisting mainly 
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of private banks and several of the public banks. Mr. Morello feels that by the year 2000, the 70 
private banks will merge or dissolve into approximately 40. The final division is made up of the 
smaller public and private banks that exist now tenuously close to the precipice of extinction. 
COMPETITIVE FUTURE 
Despite the seemingly difficult current conditions, the fundamental importance of the 
success within the financial markets in Argentina guarantees a large market in which to operate 
and a great deal of competition therein. As the market in Argentina and Latin America improves 
as a whole, there will be great opportunities for growth and success. With many of the more 
radical economic policy changes in place and some of the largest hurdles behind it, the Argentine 
market eagerly awaits a period of sustained growth in order to create an environment befitting its 
potential. 
As the financial markets continue to adjust to the growing pains associated with economic 
change, the banking industry is setting its views on the prospects of success on the long run. The 
larger local banks are continuing to establish partnerships with foreign banks in hopes of gaining a 
competitive edge in the markets of foreign investments, lines of trade and asset management. By 
doing so they also hope to regain the consumer confidence lost in past economic crises. This will 
no doubt enable banks such as Banco Rio and Banco Galicia to compete on the same level with 
institutions such as Citibank. As for the potential for success for other American banks seeking to 
penetrate this region, Mr. Morello speculates that this is an excellent time to do so. As more 
foreign operations establish themselves here it fosters growth on several accounts. First, it will 
aid in reestablishing confidence in the Argentine market. Secondly, it will aid domestic banks to 
form partnerships with these banks to strengthen their own positions in the markets. Finally, it 
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will introduce more competition into the bureaucratic system and help drive costs down and drive 
out the inefficiencies of the poorly operated smaller banks and state banks. Though, as stated 
previously, this may cause financial disruptions in the short run, these changes are essential if 
Argentina hopes to fulfill its' aspirations of achieving full integration into the world economy. 
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ID. ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION (BECTHEL) 
Each market in Latin America has been affected differently by the economic stabilization 
plan being implemented in Argentina. The primary driver of change and development in the 
financial sector has been fiscal reform, deregulation, economic growth and stabilization. 
However, in the engineering construction market, the primary influence is that of the trend of 
privatization. 
THEA~CTSOFPmvA~TION 
Beginning in the late 80's, with the election of current President Carlos Menem, Argentina 
began an aggressive plivatization program. The motivation behind such a progressive move is 
simple. The primary drivers influencing change in Argentina will be exports and investment. With 
the reluctance of Argentines to invest in enterprises and development the key lies with 
international capital. One hundred and eighty privatizations of state owned enterprises from 
1990-1992 generated cash receipts for the treasury ofUS$5,437.7 million, a transfer of liabilities 
ofUS$I,570.7 million, and a public debt reduction through redemption of debt papers for a 
market value ofUS$4,419.8 million(US$II,334.9 million in par value). All this adds to an 
economic result ofUS$18,343.4 million(4). Over 320 companies or business groups took over 
the privatized enterprises, either individually or in consortia. Argentine concerns contributed 27.9 
percent of the equity and the foreign concerns another 41.2 percent. Of the balance 30.9 percent, 
held by the state, one portion will be borrowed from the public on the Stock Exchanges and the 
other distributed among the staff through employee stock ownership plans. The foreign owners 
of privatized companies, in decreasing order, are the following countries: Spain, United States, 
Italy, France, Chile, Canada, and the UK(4). 
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HISTORICAL OPERATIONS 
Bechtel, one of the five largest engineering finns in the US, has had operations in South 
America since the 1970's. They began mining operations in Chile in the 80's. In Argentina they 
opened an office in 1975 only to close it in 1990. Their current Argentine operations have been in 
existence since early 1995. Bechtel bids focus in the markets of power generation projects, civil 
infrastructure including all forms of transportation, airport projects, water/waste water, 
hydroelectricity, mining/metal, advanced technologies, and petro/pipeline projects. 
MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 
In terms of market opportunities, they vary in size, scope and region. In Argentina many 
of the engineering construction projects are in simple high-rise building projects. However, great 
potential lies within the airport development sector. After years of very little investment in this 
subsector due to budgetary cutbacks, interest and investment is expected to grow in response to a 
plan for the privatization of the two major airports in Buenos Aires. There are another 37 smaller 
international airports and 200 domestic airports throughout the country are expected to be offered 
for concession to private finns. Plans call for increasing capacity by 300% over the next 10 
years. This, no doubt, has created a demand for knowledgeable firms to facilitate this growth. In 
this sub sector, American suppliers enjoy an excellent reputation for quality, reliability, and price 
competitiveness. Other prospects for future bids will be a massive bridge spanning from Buenos 
Aires to Colonia, Uruguay, much the same as the highway leading to the Florida Keys. 
The mining sector of this market is found predominately in Chile. In this market, as in 
most other markets, American firms will enter into a successfully acquired bid project by way of a 
joint venture where the American firm will focus its strength on technical expertise, efficiency, and 
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thoroughness while utilizing local know how in terms of labor acquisition and the actual physical 
construction of the project. 
Brazil, despite having the largest economy in South America, has been slower in its 
privatization process. Therefore, there lies tremendous opportunities for market penetration in 
this country. Many international firms have begun to focus or refocus their efforts into Brazil. 
Areas of particular interest are in the infrastructure sector as well as the petro/pipeline sector. As 
the impact of the Real plan introduced by President F emando Henrique Cardoso takes effect by 
way of market reform, privatization, and trade liberalization, the affects of this open economy will 
bring much the same result as it has in Chile and Argentina. 
COMPETITION 
Though American firms have the reputation of high quality standards, efficiency, 
and effectiveness, they have met an increasing amount of competition as of late, not only from 
their American counterparts, but also European and domestic corporations as weU. Generally 
speaking, many American firms thrive in markets such as energy development, with corporations 
such as Tenneco and Houston Lighting and Gas dominating the bidding process in these areas. 
The French have made great strides in ascertaining the majority role of the water\waste water 
management subsector in Argentina. Many of the infrastructure projects awarded are done so 
based on political ties. Typically, domestic companies backed by wealthy families have tended to 
win man of these bids, to the dismay of the better equipped and more knowledgeable American 
firms. 
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Mr. Albert Nelson, Director of Bidding Operations for Becthel, says that the key 
to penetrating this market is much the same as that of markets in the United States-to be very 
specialized in one or two areas and to seek only projects within that specific realm. Though 
Bechtel bids on various projects, they have found particular success focusing on Chile's mining 
projects and Brazil's aggressive infrastructure renovation plans. Though many of Argentina's 
largest privatization projects have been awarded, Bechtel is actively pursuing the competitive 
market of airport privatization. By specializing on these markets in the respective countries, 
Bechtel and other international finns have found greater success. 
There are other outside forces that dictate the success of American firms 
attempting to penetrate the engineeting construction market. Because American firms are held by 
US law to uphold the US standard of business even while operating in foreign countries they often 
find themselves at a disadvantage. For example, when dealing with a privatization of a public 
service, one of the things that a company depends on is the ability to raise rates when justifiable 
costs that make up your rate base are increased. In Latin America these regulations either do not 
exist or when they do exist are not sophisticated, objective or strictly enforced. As a result, 
American corporations find themselves outbid by foreign companies that have no intention of 
following standards. As the regulatory environment becomes more streamlined and American 
firms more acclimated to the business practices in Latin America opportunities will present 
themselves on a more even playing field upon which American firms can compete. 
WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS 
As most American corporations have chosen to do, Bechtel has taken the long term view 
of operations in Latin America. F or example, as opposed to designating Latin American 
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operations as an entity of an existing business unit, Bechtel has chosen to spin off Latin American 
operations as an autonomous business unit. They generate their own budget and operate for all 
practical purposes as an independent corporation. This trend will allow corporations greater 
flexibility and control in the decision making process. 
SPECIFIC MARKETS 
For the time being it seems apparent that Brazil is the market focus due to its extensive, 
aggressive privatization programs left to be completed. Also, Chile will continue to have 
excellent prospects for projects in specific markets as spoken of earlier in this section. Argentina, 
though retaining the title as one of the major emerging markets in the world for foreign 
investment, will prove to be a very competitive market in the area of engineering construction. 
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IV. AIR FREIGHT\EXPRESS MAIL (FEDERAL EXPRESS) 
HISTORY OF OPERATIONS AND CURRENT ACTIVITIES 
As the Argentine economy recovers, stabilizes, and grows and the Mercosur trade pact 
creates further regional trade opportunities, there will be a natural increase in domestic and 
international shipments. This is a necessity in order to meet deadlines, improve services, and 
maintain consistent flow of finished goods inventories. With the current postal service unable to 
fulfill these time sensitive demands, the market for express air freight and mail service has created 
a sizable market for American owned freight giants such as Federal Express, DHL, and United 
Parcel Service. 
Federal Express has been active in this market for the past six years operating 
predominately in the greater Buenos Aires area. The first two years F edEx, operated under the 
name of Flying Tigers air freight, an established company acquired by FedEx in the late 80's. 
With this acquisition F edEx assumed Flying Tigers' global operations in totality and thus began an 
aggressive international market penetration like few others. 
Unlike in the US where FedEx's market consists of90 percent domestic mail service and 
only 10 percent international, in Argentina, F edEx does not provide domestic mail service. 100 
percent ofFedEx's business is derived from the international air freight and express mail service. 
MARKET PENETRATION AND GROWTH PHILOSOPHY 
Unlike in the United States where Federal Express spends millions of dollars per annum 
on numerous advertising campaigns, in Argentina this Malcolm Baldridge winning corporation has 
relied solely on mouth to mouth and direct sales visits for its growth. Though this may seem 
archaic it simply came down to the fact that they did not have the man power to support a 
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substantial boom in business. Despite this, since beginning operations FedEx S.A. has 
experienced 100 percent growth from month to month for extended periods during a several year 
period. Because of this, the number of employees has grown rapidly from 30 employees three 
years ago to over 100 and is still growing rapidly. The apparent reason for such growth is the 
direct result of the fact that Om.., was at one point the only alternative to the poor services 
provided by the post office. Because of this, Om.., was allowed to charge over $100 dollars for a 
shipment that in the US would normally cost $20 dollars, a 500 percent markup. FedEx entered 
the market charging merely $30 dollars for the same service. Needless to say, as a result of this, 
acquiring business was merely a matter of time. 
F edEx's philosophies in terms of employee and service focus is consistent around the 
world. For example, Federal Express pays its' employees twice that ofDm.., and 33 percent more 
than their counterparts in the United States. Because of this, they have no shortage of applicants 
and the luxury of employing only candidates who can speak English, have university caliber 
educations and are willing to work over time. By doing so they have achieved a 100 percent 
employee retention rate thus saving the high costs of constantly training new employees. They 
can therefore pass the savings on to the customer by way of lower rates and consistently high 
service. 
Because Dm.." at one point, was the exclusive provider of these specialty services, they 
were not only allowed to determine their own rates but were allowed to provide whatever service 
they wished. Federal Express has taken a far different approach to this market. Instead of 
focusing on rapidly attaining greater market share they, have focused on steady growth while 
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providing far better service at lower costs. As their clientele grows, so does their employee base 
while their service and prices remain constant. 
OUTSIDE INFLUENCES 
Although the express freight and courier market is in its infancy in terms of market 
exploitation, there remain numerous hurdles to overcome. The main hindrance to sustained:J 
consistent growth in this market is not necessarily the competition therein, but the regulatory 
environment. La Comision Nacional de Correos y Telegrafos is the governing body over this 
division of commerce and through no fault of their own, have in place an archaic, stringent 
regulatory structure. These regulations when introduced were meant explicitly for the postal 
service and have yet to be adapted for the time sensitive services provided by couriers such as 
FedEx and Dm.... For example, Argentina, for domestic postal division purposes, has been 
divided into 7 different regions and if Federal Express needs to ship from area 1 to 3 they are 
forced to adhere to the same regulations as the national post office. The main hindrance to this is 
that the postal service is moving thousands of domestic parcels a month where as Dm... and FedEx 
may only ship 6 or 7 packages inbound from Belgium. These regulatioDS:J though slowly changing, 
are obstructive in terms of time and efficiency. 
Under the relatively new Mercosur (Mercado do Sur) trade pact, air freight/courier 
services anticipated and experienced a large growth in business due to the increased export and 
import market in and out of South America. However, the courier side of Federal Express's 
services was not included under the auspices of Mer co sur. In essence, ifgoods are shipped 
classified as courier, though on the same plane as air freight classified goods:J it is not under 
Mercosur regulations and therefore cannot be priced as such. 
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Another very tangible obstacle to efficient operations for these corporations is the 
inadequate transportation/telecommunications infrastructure. Although many civil projects have 
been bidded out to private corporations, these projects have yet to be completed and make in an 
impact on the capacity to transport goods in a timely fashion. As well, the telecommunications 
services are in dire need of renovation. It can take as long as 18 months to install a telephone 
line. Not only is this an obstacle to maintaining sufficient communications throughout the 
growing FedEx system, but it keeps the general public from accessing Federal Express's services 
without having to go to a customer service center. 
One factor that invariably must be considered by any American firm operating on foreign 
soil is the economic and political stability. In Argentina, Federal Express has taken the necessary 
precautions to brace for a an economic depression or a radical political shift. One such precaution 
is that they have rented nearly ever building that they occupy. By doing so, if it is necessary, 
Federal Express can end operations in this country and withdraw to a safer region within one to 
two months. 
FUTURE PLANS FOR GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 
As previously stated, this market has yet to be fully exploited. Federal Express is planning 
to expand and diversify their services based on the success already achieved. Though, slowly, the 
penetration plan is to improve their established services and introduce new product packages 
aimed at specialty markets such as, the chemical and automobile parts industry. By doing so, they 
will only grow when established services in a specific market are operating to the high standards 
set by Federal Express, thus ensuring the consistency of high service and customer satisfaction for 
which the FedEx name is known. 
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Mr. Zapiola, director ofFedEx's operations in the Southern Cone, feels that there are 
numerous opportunities for more competition to enter this market. An example of this are the 
nearly 300 new private postal services that have sprung up in the last 16 months. Though Mr. 
Zapiola expects only 30 to 40 to survive, he feels that the ability to provide a specialized, unique 
service to the customers will be the key to success for any new express service. For example, 
FedEx, UPS, and DHL cannot provide radical services such as delivering packages to the middle 
east with next day service, however, there are 2 or 3 companies who are willing to charge the 
expense to do so. This extreme example, is the type of extremely specialized service, though 
exorbitantly expensive, that will be the key to establishing a successful air freight/courier service 
in this region. 
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v. TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR (MOVICOM S.A.l 
Currently in Argentina there exist two major telecommunication companies, Telefonica 
Argentina and Telecom, both recently privatized. While the population in Argentina is 34.2 
million the market penetration of these two companies is merely 78 telephones per 1000 people, 
or 7.7 percent. Obviously, there exists a large market to be filled. With over half of Argentina's 
population (16 million) residing in 1 of 4 cities (Buenos Aires 13 million, Cordoba 1 million, 
Rosario 1 million, Mendoza 1 million,) the potential market for a telecommunications corporation 
is obvious. This is the essential reason for the existence for CRM, trade name Movicom. CRM, 
Compania de Radiocomunicaciones Moviles, is a 6 year old portable telecommunications 
company now operating in Argentina. CRM is a shell corporation made up of a joint venture 
consisting of BellSouth, Motorola, International BellSouth Enterprises, BGH, and SACMA. Due 
to tender restrictions in place in this particular sector CRM was required to utilize a local operator 
and manufacturer, BGM and SACMA fulfilled this requirement, respectively. In speaking with 
Steven Droll, Director of Administration and Finance, this requirement, though initially 
cumbersome, allowed Movicom to exploit the local expertise of these two operations. 
MARKET SELECTION/CHARACTERISTICS 
The portable communications market in Buenos Aires is radically different than its 
counterpart in the United States. In the United States the radio communications market is 60-70 
percent mobile ( car phones) and 3040 percent portable (hand held). Where as in the greater 
Buenos Aires area the market is nearly 95% portable. In light of the fact that their is often a 12 
month waiting list to obtain the most basic of phone service and the poor level of reliability of the 
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existing system one can gather why there is such a demand for reliable mobile communications. 
According to Mr. Droll, 5 years ago, if one could acquire a phone at all they were fortunate, now 
that one can easily obtain a mobile phone they want to take it everywhere. As well, it is far more 
convenient for a corporation, businessperson, or family to purchase a more reliable cellular phone 
and gain instant access to local and long distance calling. In addition to the dire need for 
consistent telephone service, the fact that 38% of the population of Argentina, or 13 million 
people, are densely populated into the capital city of Buenos Aires presents a rich market to 
exploit. These two factors stand alone as the main justification for the establishment of Movicom 
in Buenos Aires. 
MARKE T/COMPE TmON 
Due to the $2500 initial cost of acquiring a phone and service Movicom is currently 
focused on the high end market, predominately the upper class business executive. However, as 
financing becomes more realistic and the economy of Argentina continues to show consistent 
stability and improvement, Movicom plans on cutting deeper into the lower levels of the 
Argentine socioeconomic strata. Competition, however, does exist in this market, in the way of 
Miniphone. A small but well established mobile telecommunications retailer focusing on pagers as 
well as cellular phones. Despite this competition, the fact that this market is in its infancy provides 
ample market share for both corporations. 
PROSPECTS ON THE FUTURE 
One would assume that as the local telephone service improves this will cut into the 
mobile communications market. However, Movicom sees this as a double edged sword. As local 
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services improve so to will the call completion rate ofMovicom's mobile phones, currently at 
50%., thus making it more attractive to utilize the convenience of mobile communications. 
Secondly, as more of the public obtain basic telephone setvices, the minutes of usage on the 
mobile network will vary directly, only enhancing the attraction to mobile communications. 
Finally, I speculate based on the sophisticated image associated with sauntering down the street 
with a mobile phone to one's ear that this market will continue to move in a positive direction. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The preceding discussion was meant to illustrate why Argentina possesses favorable 
attributes for further American business expansion. My research indicates that the five year plan 
employed by the Menem administration has not only stabilized the economy but also laid the 
groundwork for future growth. Several other key policies employed by the Menem administration 
that have contributed to this have been the convertibility act, a comprehensive deregulation of 
economic activities, privatization of state-owned companies, the consolidation of public debt, the 
balancing of public accounts, and regional economic integration by way of the Mercosur pact. 
Research indicates that after six years of consistent efforts, the achieved results are clear. 
Tangible results include price stability, plummeting inflation, recovery of creditworthiness, 
expansion of exports, significant growth in the gross domestic product and balanced public 
accounts. This has created a favorable environment for American businesses. In talking with 
representatives from various business sectors, I conclude that American business success is due in 
large part to the improved economic atmosphere in Argentina. Specifically, privatizations have 
allowed for many industries to penetrate their respective markets by bidding on formerly state 
owned enterprises. Secondly, the economic stability derived from the convertibility act, decreased 
inflation, increased public confidence, and a marked turnaround regarding economic growth have 
created an environment in which corporations such as Bechtel, Federal Express, and Movicom 
can operate relatively free of economic distraction and thus achieve full market integration and 
success. 
What will the future hold? So much of the future rests solely on the decisions made in the 
near future, specifically, the next presidential election. In a country prone to radical changes, only 
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a continuation of the positive steps already taken will ensure that Argentina, as a country, will 
expand to fulfill its aspirations as a country fully integrated into the world economy_ 
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APPENDIX 
" 1 It 
luten-jew Schedule 
Oct.31.9S: American Chamber of Martin Porcell; Trade Specialist 
Commerce 
Oct.13.95: Bristol Myers-Squibb Alejandro Bildasoso; Director of 
Operations 
Oct.19.95: Citibank Ignacio Morello; Manager 
Oct.20.95: Federal Express Horacio Gandini; Manager of 
Operations 
Oct.13.95: Clorox Karin Hartman;Director of Marketing 
Oct.18.95: Dow Chemical Jorge Zavaleta; Director of Operations 
Aug.31.95: U niversidad Del Salvador Dr. Pertitt Mustonen;Professor of 
Economics 
Sep.26.95: Circle Freight Michael Robinson; Director of 
Operations 
Oct.12.95: Proctor & Gamble Luis Alcazar; Director of Operations 
Oct.9.95: Bs.As Herald Scott Johnson; Financial Reporter 
Sep.12.95: 3M Philipe Sanchez;Director of South AM. 
Operations 
Oct.9.95: Bechtel Albert Nelson;General Manager 
Operations 
Oct.l0.95: Movicom Steven Droll;Financial Director 
